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ABSTRACT
We determine empirically how the Big Three automakers accommodate shocks to demand. They
have the capability to change prices, alter labor inputs through temporary layoffs and overtime, or
adjust  inventories.  These  adjustments  are  interrelated,  non-convex,  and  dynamic  in  nature.
Combining weekly plant-level data on production schedules and output with monthly data on sales
and transaction prices, we estimate a dynamic profit-maximization model of the firm. Using impulse
response functions, we demonstrate that when an automaker is hit with a demand shock sales
respond immediately, prices respond gradually, and production responds only after a delay. The size
of the immediate sales response is linear in the size of the shock, but the delayed production response
is non-convex in the size of the shock. For sufficiently large shocks the cumulative production
response over the product cycle is an order of magnitude larger than the cumulative price response.
We examine two recent demand shocks: the Ford Explorer/Firestone tire recall of 2000, and the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
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george.hall@yale.eduIn the short-run, the period over which the capital stock and the number of employees is ﬁxed, au-
tomobile manufacturers have three primary margins to respond to temporary changes in demand. First,
having some market power, they can increase or decrease expected sales by appropriately changing prices.
In practice, these price changes often take the form of dealer and customer incentives. Second, they can
raise or lower the level of production through adjusting labor inputs by altering the length of the work-
week or engaging in temporary layoffs. Third, they may allow inventories on dealer lots to accumulate or
de-accumulate. The relative costs of each of these margins determine the shape and slope of the supply
curve for new automobiles.
In this paper we determine empirically how the Big Three automakers have accommodated shocks
to demand. Consistent with previous work (e.g. Bresnahan and Ramey, 1994), we ﬁnd that automakers
frequently adjust their labor input to increase or decrease production; the average assembly plant uses
temporarylayoffs6percentofthetimetoreduceproductionandovertime30percentofthetimetoincrease
production. Transaction prices, net of rebates and ﬁnancing incentives, ﬂuctuate considerably, typically
falling about 9 percent over the model year (see Copeland, Dunn and Hall, 2005). Dealers inventories
are large and volatile; on average dealers hold about 13 weeks worth of sales in inventory and this ratio
varies from 7 to 20 (25th and 75th percentiles, respectively). Because these margins of adjustment are
interrelated, nonconvex, and dynamic in nature, we estimate a dynamic proﬁt maximization model of an
automaker’s choice of adjustment to short-term demand ﬂuctuations. Combining weekly plant-level data
on production schedules and output with monthly data on transaction prices and sales we ﬁnd that the
propensity to use these alternative margins depends on: 1) the magnitude of the shock; 2) where the ﬁrm
is in the product cycle; 3) the level of demand relative to the plant’s minimum efﬁcient scale; and 4) the
current level of inventories.
Speciﬁcally, when an automaker is faced with a demand shock to a particular make and model, sales
respond immediately. The size of this immediate response is linear in the magnitude of the shock. Prices
respond gradually. The higher the initial level of demand and the lower the level of inventories, the more
pronounced is the price response. The ﬁrm’s production responses, on the other hand, are often delayed
and discrete. Because of nonconvexities in its cost function, the ﬁrm has an incentive to operate the plant at
its minimum efﬁcient scale (MES), the rate of production that minimizes average cost. If the shock causes
the ﬁrm to desire a rate of production below its MES, the ﬁrm engages in an “all on/all off” production
pattern, using weeklong shutdowns to convexify its costs. In the periods immediately after a demand
shock, the rate of production may remain unchanged. However, in later weeks the ﬁrm modiﬁes its level
2of production by discrete changes in the workweek thus smoothing its production response over time. For
sufﬁciently large shocks the cumulative production response over the product cycle is between 10 and 20
times larger than the cumulative price response.
While the effects of the nonconvexity in weekly production are dampened by time aggregation, they
are not eliminated. Thresholds in the production response remain and these threshold generate small non-
linearities in the future price response. Early in the production cycle, small differences in the magnitude
of a shock can generate up to 1.4 percentage point differences in level of production over the remainder
of the product cycle, but only 5/100 of a percent differences in the cumulative price response. Later in the
product cycle, these effects can be as large as 6 percent for cumulative production, but again only about
5/100 of a percent for cumulative prices.
How ﬁrms set prices and output in response to a demand shock is a classic issue in economics going
backtoatleastHallandHitch(1939). Fromourreadingoftheliterature, therewasaburstofpaperswritten
on this topic in the late 1960s and early 1970s.1 As with our analysis, these papers typically found that the
demand shocks were absorbed by output changes rather than price changes. This result was sometimes
interpreted as evidence of ‘sticky prices.’ While we ﬁnd a small and gradual price response, prices in our
model are full ﬂexible. Interest in ﬁrm responses to demand shocks seems to have diminished since the
mid 1970s with the increased focus on supply-side shocks as the primary disturbance driving the business
cycle. Nevertheless we revisit this issue because plant-level dynamics have macroeconomics implications.
The motor vehicle sector is a sizable fraction of the economy, accounting for almost 4 percent of
real GDP in 2003 and 2004. Further, it has a disproportionately large effect on the volatility of GDP. In
2003 and 2004, motor vehicle output accounted for 6.3 and 4.5 percent of real GDP growth respectively.2
In addition, new motor vehicle prices have CPI weights of 4.7 percent.3 Hence, production and price
changes of new automobiles have observable effects on the aggregate rate of output growth and the rate
of inﬂation. Furthermore, given the prominent role automobiles have in the manufacturing sector in the
U.S. and worldwide, we believe that understanding how automakers respond to temporary demand shocks
helps in understanding ﬁrm pricing and production decisions more generally.
Decisions about inventories, prices, and production are all central to ﬁrm proﬁt maximization, but
most analysis focuses on only two of these margins at a time. Much of the traditional inventory literature
1Nordhaus and Godley (1972) summarize much of this literature.
2Computed from numbers in Selected NIPA Tables, Survey of Current Business, July 2005
3Bureau of Labor Statistics website, Table of the Relative Importance of Components in the Consumer Price Index. These are
2001-2002 weights.
3address the role of inventories on the timing and volatility of output. The bulk of this literature assumes
ﬁrms schedule production in the face of exogenous stochastic demand holding prices ﬁxed to minimize the
discounted value of expected costs.4 In these models, ﬁrms typically face both upward-sloping marginal
cost curves and costs of adjustment to the level of output. To justify these assumptions, authors usually
appeal to, without directly deriving, short-run diminishing marginal returns to labor and costs associated
with changing the size the labor force, such as hiring and ﬁring cost. We build on this literature by,
ﬁrst, embedding the ﬁrm’s cost minimization problem within a proﬁt maximization framework (and thus
endogenizing prices and sales). Second, we explicitly link the cost of production to the costs of various
margins of adjustment of the labor input.
In operations research the study of the inventory/price tradeoff falls under the headings revenue man-
agement or yield management.5 In the economics literature, work by Reagan (1982), Aguirregabiria
(1999), Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton and Silva-Risso (2003), and Chan, Hall and Rust (2005) study the
interaction between inventory management and pricing. These papers, along with much of the operations
research literature, assume simple cost functions. In Reagan, the production function is linear, and in
Zettelmeyer et. al., production (procurement) is exogenous; in Aguirregabiria and Chan, et. al. the pro-
duction function is linear with a ﬁxed set-up cost (i.e. an (S,s) framework). In the current paper, as in
our previous work (Copeland, Dunn and Hall, 2005), we study the interplay of inventories and pricing in
a model that explicitly incorporates realistic labor costs. In our former paper we explained the coexis-
tence of downward-sloped prices proﬁles with hump-shaped sales and inventories within a deterministic
model. In the current paper, we add a demand shock to study how optimal policies are affected by demand
disturbances.
A third literature studies the tradeoff between inventories and employment.6 In this literature the link
between employment and production is explicit; hence a ﬁrm that faces a change in demand can respond
either by changing its labor input or allowing inventories to ﬂuctuate. However in these models, there is
no pricing decision.
Of the papers we are familiar with, the closest to ours are Haltiwanger and Maccini (1988) and Ramey
and Vine (2004). Haltiwanger and Maccini use an intertemporal optimization model to characterize the
4Blinder and Maccini (1991a,b) and Ramey and West (1999) provide comprehensive surveys of this vast literature.
5This literature which started with Whiten (1955) and Karlin and Carr (1962) is reviewed by Federgruen and Heching (1999)
and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003).
6Relevant contributions include Topel (1982), Maccini and Rossana (1984), Rossana (1990), and Galeotti, Maccini, and
Schiantarelli (2005).
4behavior of a ﬁrm subject to random demand ﬂuctuations. Prior to observing demand, the ﬁrm chooses
the product price and the size of its work force; after the shock, the ﬁrm can vary output (and thus end-
of-period inventories) by choosing the number of workers to layoff and hours work for those who work.
Given the relative value to the ﬁrm of holding inventories versus laying off workers, ﬁrms are classiﬁed as
being either inventory-biased or layoff-biased. Inventory-biased ﬁrms respond to relatively small declines
in demand solely by accumulating inventories. Both types of ﬁrms use both margins in response to large
declines in demand. In the empirical analysis of their model, Haltiwanger and Maccini (1989) take prices
and new orders as exogenous to the ﬁrm, and are therefore silent on the price/inventory tradeoff.
Ramey and Vine (2004) use Hall’s (2000) nonconvex cost-minimization model of an automobile as-
sembly plant to argue that a decrease in the autocorrelation of sales over the last two decades has led to
a reduction in the volatility of output in the U.S. automobile industry. While we are limited by our price
data to study a much shorter time period than Ramey and Vine, we are able to add a pricing decision to the
problem.
The remainder of this paper has three parts. In the ﬁrst we present our data and describe some its key
features. In the second part, we solve and estimate the automaker’s dynamic decision problem. We then
report impulse response functions of price, sales, and production to shocks to demand. Finally, in the third
part, we examine two recent shocks to the automobile industry: the tread-separation tire recall of the Ford
Explorer in 2000 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The ﬁrst event represents a true demand
shock, while the aggregate time series of prices, sales and production corresponding to the second shock
do not accord with the expected responses from a negative demand shock.
1 The Data
The dataset studied in this paper is a merger of two datasets that provide detailed information on sales,
prices, inventories, and production of 46 models assembled at 28 single-source automobile factories run
by Ford, GM, and Daimler-Chrysler (the Big Three). A single-source plant is a facility that is the exclusive
producer of a vehicle line. Focusing on single-source plants, we are able to line up inventory, sales and
price data by vehicle line to production and hours worked by plant.
The ﬁrst dataset was obtained from Wards Communications and contains weekly production data from
each assembly plant in the U.S. and Canada for the ﬁrst week of 1999 through the ﬁrst ﬁve weeks of 2004.
For each week the plant operated, it shows: 1. the number of days the plant operated; 2. the number of
5days the plant was down for holidays, supply disruptions, model changeovers, or inventory adjustments;
3. the number of shifts run; 4. the hours per shift run; 5. the scheduled jobs per day (line speed); and 6.
the actual production for each vehicle line produced at the plant.7
We match these weekly data to a second dataset on monthly prices, sales, production and inventories
by model and model year constructed in Copeland, Dunn, and Hall (2005). Foreign manufacturers are
excluded because of problems measuring overseas production. The sales and production numbers in this
second dataset also come from Wards Communications. The price data, however, are derived from retail
transactions captured at dealerships by J.D. Power and Associates (JDPA).8 JDPA attempts to measure
precisely the price customers pay for their vehicle, adjusting the price when a dealership under or overval-
ues a customer’s trade-in vehicle as part of a new vehicle sale. JDPA also reports the average cash rebate
and average ﬁnancial package customers received from the manufacturer.
Combining the weekly production dataset with the second dataset on prices, inventories and sales
provides us with a detailed picture of the Big Three’s pricing and production choices. Because this paper
focuses on the operation of an automobile assembly plant, we aggregate the single-source data to the
plant/model-year level. This dataset includes 28 factories and has a total of 149 plant/model-year pairs.
As illustrated in table 1, this output represents about 34 percent of all Big Three vehicles sold in the U.S.
over our sample period.
Vehicles produced at single-source plants are like those produced at multiple plants. The mean price
of single-source vehicles is only slightly above the mean price over the entire dataset. Further, with the
exception of pickup trucks, single-source plants produce sizeable numbers of vehicles in all market seg-
ments.9 The single-source subset also is composed of roughly equal amounts from each of the Big Three,
although Chrysler is over-represented.
Assembly plants usually operate at full speed (i.e. each shift works 40 hours a week), or not at all.10
This non-convexity shows up most clearly at the weekly production level, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1. This
ﬁgure plots the weekly output of Chrysler’s Jefferson North factory, the sole assembly plant of the Jeep
7We thank Dan Vine and Valerie Ramey for providing these data from 1999 to 2001. For the remaining years, the data was
taken from weekly issues of Ward’s Automotive Reports and the annual issues of Ward’s Automotive Yearbook.
8The price data were constructed by Corrado, Dunn, and Otoo (2004), who obtained it from J.D. Power and Associates.
9Few single-source plants produce pickups mainly due to data collection and naming conventions. Unlike other market seg-
ments, a large variety of essentially different pickups tend to be grouped under one name. Ford F-series pickup trucks incorporates
a variety of different vehicles (e.g. F-150, F-250, F-350, etc.), a much wider variety than those vehicles sold under model names
in other categories (e.g. Ford Escort or Ford Excursion). Because the production data are collected by model name, we ﬁnd that
several popular pickups are produced at four or ﬁve plants.
10See for example Bresnahan and Ramey (1994) and Hall (2000). Hamermesh (1989) also reports similar results for seven
large U.S. manufacturing plants of a large U.S. durable-goods producer.
6Sum of Sales (thousands) Average Price
Entire Sample Single Source % diff Entire Sample Single Source % diff
Market Segment
Compact 4,706 842 18 13,648 14,776 108
Sporty 1,258 1,251 99 25,797 24,499 95
Midsize 11,272 3,927 35 19,247 19,962 104
Traditional 2,134 1,321 62 23,743 23,229 98
Luxury 2,399 1,757 73 36,554 35,757 98
Pickup 13,650 777 6 23,593 20,194 86
SUV 12,868 4,718 37 28,711 28,982 101
Vans 6,321 4,060 64 22,645 22,611 100
Company
Chrysler 11,692 5,016 43 22,726 24,480 108
Ford 19,121 5,912 31 24,090 26,606 110
GM 23,794 7,726 32 23,546 23,190 98
Total 54,607 18,654 34 23,561 24,620 104
Table 1: Comparing Single-Source Data Relative to the Entire Sample
Grand Cherokee. The tendency for an assembly plant to shutdown completely for a week, if it shuts
down at all, is clearly seen for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 model years. Over this period, the assembly
plant usually produced around 5000 vehicles a week, or none at all. Of course, there are weeks when the
temporary use of overtime ratcheted up production.
Shutdowns in weekly production occur for multiple reasons. Plant closures are grouped into four mu-
tually exclusive categories: model changeovers, holidays, inventory adjustments, and supply disruptions.
Model changeovers typically occur in the middle of July, and involve the re-tooling of factories so that
new model-year production can start. Holidays are scattered throughout the year, with the longest single
vacation occurring from December 25th to January 1st. Assembly plants are shut down for an inventory
adjustments when an automaker wants to lower its level of inventories. Finally, supply disruptions are
stoppages in production due to parts shortages, power outages, hurricanes, and similar events.
Over our ﬁve year sample, assembly plants shutdowns are roughly equally attributable to model
changeovers, holidays, and inventory adjustments (see table 2). Supply disruptions play a minor role
in explaining shutdowns, accounting for less than 5 percent of all factory shutdowns.11 Table 3 displays
11These numbers from single-source plants are close to the ﬁgures reported in Bresnahan and Ramey (1994), which examined
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Figure 1: Weekly Grand Cherokee Production
Model Changeovers Holidays Inventory Adjustments Supply Disruptions
Percent of days shutdown 27.3 37.4 30.7 4.6
Percent of all days 5.6 7.7 6.3 0.9
Table 2: Decomposition of shutdowns
the duration of shutdowns by type. Because of the non-convex cost structure, most plant shutdowns are
either for a day or an entire week. Of all the weeks in our sample, plants were shut down for one day in
the week 14.2 percent of time, while plants were shut down for an entire week 15.9 percent of the time.
Shutdowns that lasted between 2 to 4 days of the week account for less than 4 percent of all weeks in our
sample. Looking across the various causes for which plants stop production, we ﬁnd that single day shut-
downs are almost entirely attributable to holidays. Further, model changeovers and inventory adjustments,
for the most part, involve a week-long shutdown.
To analyze how production varies with prices and sales, we turn to our monthly data. We ﬁrst analyze
the relationship between assembly plant shutdowns and prices, sales, and inventories. We estimate a probit
where the dependent variable, Y, is equal to one if the assembly plant was shutdown at some point in
the month. The independent variables are last month’s sales and prices, beginning-of-period inventories,
a model-year monthly trend term, and assembly plant ﬁxed effects. Letting s;p;i;m be sales, prices,
8Shutdown Duration
One Day Two Days Three Days Four Days Entire Week
Holiday 13.5 2.3 1.1 0.0 3.4
Model Changeover 0.0 0 0 0 5.6
Inventory Adjustment 0 0 0 0.1 6.3
Supply Disruption 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
Total 14.2 2.4 1.2 0.2 15.9
Table 3: Frequency of shutdowns by category and duration (percent of total weeks)
Estimate Standard Errors Marginal Effect
ln(pt¡1) -1.938 0.793 -0.192
ln(st¡1) -0.438 0.133 -0.043
ln(it) 0.797 0.177 0.079
mt -0.035 0.024 -0.003
Table 4: Estimated Probit Parameters
inventories, and the model-year trend variable respectively, we write the probit as





where ft = f1;2;:::Fg designates to which factory the observation belongs, 1x=y is an indicator variable
equal to one if x = y, and V is an i.i.d error term. The estimated coefﬁcients on lagged price, sales, and
inventories, shown in table 4, are signiﬁcantly different from zero and have the expected signs. If prices or
salesarehighinthepreviousmonth(forexample, ifdemandisstrong), thentheprobabilityoftheassembly
plant shutting down next month decreases. Further, the higher inventory levels climb, the more likely a
factory will close. Lastly, the estimate of the trend coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcant. While these estimates
accord well with theory, we are cautious in interpreting the strength of these results because the probit’s
explanatory power is low; the R2 is 0.12.
Tocapturetheco-movementsinprices, sales andproduction, weestimatethreeleastsquare regressions
of sales, price, and production. For all three regressions, the independent variables are a lag of prices, a lag
of sales, beginning-of-period inventories, and a trend. Because we are interested in the dynamics of the
data and not the cross section, we take out the plant-level mean of all variables. This approach allows us to
control for plant-level ﬁxed effects, without worrying about estimating ﬁxed effects. As will be apparent
later, this is a signiﬁcant advantage under our indirect-inference estimation methodology. Let ˆ xt denote a
9Sales Equation Price Equation Production Equation
parameter estimate std err estimate std err estimate std err
lagged price 0.172 0.035 0.787 0.006 0.787 0.072
lagged sales 0.641 0.009 0.0443 0.0051 0.376 0.028
inventories 0.0858 0.0024 -0.0076 0.0012 0.0250 0.0064
trend -0.104 0.013 -0.0432 0.0036 -0.194 0.051
s2 5.33 0.10 0.691 0.009 15.39 0.44
R-squared 0.88 0.99 0.72
Table 5: Estimated parameters
Note: std err are Newey-West standard errors with two lags.
variable minus its plant-level mean. Formally, we estimate
ˆ st = q1ˆ st¡1 + q2 ˆ pt¡1 + q3ˆ it + q4 ˆ mt + ns
t
ˆ pt = q5ˆ st¡1 + q6 ˆ pt¡1 + q7ˆ it + q8 ˆ mt + n
p
t




where q is production and n is an i.i.d. normal error. Automakers typical produce a particular vehicle
for 12 months, but through the use of inventories sell the vehicle over longer period. The sales and price
regressions are estimated using an average of 17 months of data for each vehicle, while the production
regression is estimated using an average of 12 month of data. This set of regressions provides a description
of the persistence of sales, prices and production as well as their covariances. The estimates of q are
reported in table 5, along with the variance of the residuals, s2.
Our results show that both sales and prices are highly persistent. The estimated coefﬁcient on lagged
prices in the price equation is a high 0.79, while for the sales equation our estimate on lagged sales in
0.64. Further, we ﬁnd that beginning-of-period inventories are signiﬁcantly correlated with both sales and
prices. Consistent with inventory-control theory, higher levels of inventories coincide with higher sales
and lower prices. Finally, both sales and prices have a negative trend, suggesting a fall in demand over the
model year. Turning to production, we ﬁnd it is negatively correlated with last month’s price and positively
correlated with last month’s sales. This is not surprising, given the highly persistent behavior of both sales
and prices. Production is also positively correlated with inventories. This result likely reﬂects automakers’
practice of producing enough cars in 12 months to build up inventories for 17 or more months of sales.
Finally, the discreteness of the production data is clearly reﬂected in the large variance of the production
residual, relative to the variance of the sales residual. Note that all three equations ﬁt the data well, despite
the simple speciﬁcation used.
102 The Model
The model examines an automaker selling a single product. The decision period is a week. A particular
model year is produced at a single plant for one year (52 weeks) and sold for two years (104 weeks). In
each of the ﬁrst 52 weeks, the ﬁrm must decide: (1) the number of vehicles to produce, qt; (2) the number
of days to operate the plant, Dt, the number of shifts to run, St, and the number of hours per shift, ht; and
(3) the retail price of the vehicle, pt
Weekly sales, st, depend on the vehicle’s own price, pt, a persistent shock zt, and a deterministic
time-varying constant term µt. The weekly demand curves
st = µt(1+zt)¡ht log(pt) (3)
take a linear-log speciﬁcation with ht denoting the week t own-price semi-elasticity. We assume the
persistent shock follows an autoregressive process:
zt+1 = rzt +wt+1 (4)
with w distributed i.i.d N(0;sw). This demand speciﬁcation implies that above some price demand for the
vehicle is zero, consistent with consumers fully substituting to other vehicles at some price. This model
ignores the interaction of demand between different model years of the same model (e.g. a 1999 and 2000
Ford Escort), because previously (Copeland, Dunn, and Hall, 2005) we found these cross-price elasticities
to be very small.
Unsold vehicles can be inventoried without depreciation. Let it+1 be the stock of vehicles that are
inventoried at the end of period t and carried over into period t+1. Current production is not available for
immediate sale, so sales can be made only from the beginning-of-period inventories:
st · it: (5)
Sales cannot be backlogged. During the production year, inventories follow the standard law of motion:
it+1 = it +qt ¡st 0 <t · 52: (6)
After 52 weeks no vehicles are produced so inventories evolve according to
it+1 = it ¡st 52 <t · 104: (7)
At the conclusion of week 104, any unsold vehicles are sold at a ﬁxed price ¯ p105.
11The vehicle is assembled at a single plant. Each period, the ﬁrm decides how many vehicles to produce
and how to organize production to minimize costs. Plant managers increase or decrease production by
altering the workweek rather than the rate of production. The plant can operate D days a week. It can run
one or two shifts, S, each day, and both shifts are h hours long. We assume the number of employees per
shift, n, and the line speed, LS, are ﬁxed. So the ﬁrm’s production function is linear in hours:
qt = Dt £St £ht £LS: (8)
Although the production function is linear, the ﬁrm faces several important non-convexities because of its
labor contract. We let w1 and w2 denote the straight-time, day-shift and evening-shift wage rates. Any
work in excess of eight hours a day, and all Saturday work, is paid at a rate of time and a half. Employees
who work fewer than 40 hours per week must be paid 85 percent of their hourly wage times the difference
between 40 and the number of hours worked. This “short week compensation” is in addition to the wages
a worker receives for the hours actually worked. If the ﬁrm chooses not to operate a plant for a week, the
workers are laid off. Laid-off workers receive u fraction of their straight-time 40-hour wage.
Such a labor contract means that if the ﬁrm decides to produce q vehicles, it must then choose how
many days to operate the plant, how many shifts to run, and how many hours to run each shift in order to
minimize its cost of production. Given these choices, the ﬁrm’s week t cost function is expressed as
c(Dt;St;htjqt) = gqt + (w1+I(St = 2)w2)£(Dthtn+max[0;0:85(40¡Dtht)n] (9)
+max[0;0:5Dt(ht ¡8)n]+max[0;0:5(Dt ¡5)8n])+uw140(2¡St)n;
where g is the per vehicle material cost, n is the employees per shift, and w1 and w2 are the hourly wage
rates paid to the ﬁrst-shift and second-shift workers, respectively. The ﬁrst term is the per-vehicle cost.
It incorporates all costs (such as materials, energy, transaction) that do not depend on the allocation of
production over the week. The ﬁrst term within the brackets represents the straight-time wages paid to the
production workers. The subsequent terms within the brackets capture the 85 percent rule for short weeks
and the statutory overtime premium. The last term is the unemployment compensation bill charged to the
ﬁrm. Let Dt = 0 if and only if St = 0. This cost function is piecewise linear with kinks at one shift running
40 hours per week and two shifts running 40 hours per week.
To see this graphically we plot in ﬁgure 2 the labor-cost portion of (9) (i.e. c(Dt;St;ht)¡gqt) condi-
tional on the plant running one or two shifts. The statutory 85% shortweek rule and overtime premia create







































Cost Running 2 shifts →
Cost Running 1 shift →
Figure 2: Labor costs as a function of weekly output conditional on running one or two shifts
of the two curves (denoted by the solid blue and green portions of the curves). Because of the kinks, the
MES is determined by the unique line (the dashed red line) from the origin that intersects the cost curve
only once. In the example plotted in ﬁgure 2 the ﬁrm minimizes average costs by operating the plant with
two shifts for a total of 80 hours per week. If the plant’s desired output is below the MES, the ﬁrm will
minimize cost by taking a convex combination of producing at 0 and producing at its MES.
The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize the present value of the discounted stream of proﬁts. For each

















subject to (3)-(8) and where c(D;S;hjq) is given by (9). The term t(st=it)y is a “revenue tax” incurred
by the automaker as a function of its sales-to-inventory ratio. This term is in the spirit of Bils and
Kahn’s (2000) inventory model in which inventories play a revenue-generating role. When inventories
are low, it is harder for potential customers to observe and gauge a vehicle (that is, to test-drive it and view
the choice set), and thus it is more costly to consummate a sale. The tax effectively disappears when the
sales-to-inventory ratio is small.
We assume that the ﬁrm must choose pt and qt before observing zt. Let V(I;z¡1;t) be the optimal
13value at week t for the ﬁrm that holds inventory I and observed a demand state of z¡1 last period. The























subject to (3), (4), and (5). Hence the ﬁrm’s pricing and production decisions are governed by the policy
functions:
pt = p(it;zt¡1;t) (13)
qt = q(it;zt¡1;t)
which solve (10).
3 Estimation of the Structural Model
We estimate the structural model in two steps. First, we employ a discrete-choice methodology to estimate
consumers’ preferences over automobiles. We use these estimates to compute the intercepts and own-
price semi-elasticities that are parameters in the market demand curves, equation (3). Second, taking these
market demand curves as given we estimate the remaining parameters via indirect inference; that is, we
select the structural parameters of the model such that when we estimate the set of regressions described in
equation (2) using model simulations, we match as closely as possible the estimated parameters reported
in table 5.
3.1 Estimating the Demand Elasticities via BLP (1995)
The demand elasticities are estimated using the approach described in our earlier work, Copeland, Dunn,
andHall(2005).12 Thedemandforautomobilesismodeledwithinadiscrete-choiceframework. Following
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), henceforth BLP, we construct the demand system by aggregating over
the discrete choices of heterogeneous individuals.
12A full description of the methodology and results are available in this earlier paper. Here, we only provide an overview of
the methodology and the ﬁnal results.
14The utility derived from choosing an automobile depends on the interaction between consumer and
product characteristics. Consumers are heterogeneous in income as well as in their tastes for certain prod-
uct characteristics. We distinguish between two types of product characteristics. Those that are observed
by the econometrician (such as horsepower and miles per gallon) are denoted by X. Those that are unob-
served by the econometrician (such as styling or prestige) are denoted by x. Drawing from the nested logit
literature, we also incorporate a correlation in the consumer’s tastes for vehicles of the same model year.
We divide vehicles into G+1 mutually exclusive groups (that is, model years)–g = 0;1;2;:::;G–where
the outside good is the sole member of group 0. We also allow households’ distaste for price, denoted by
a, to vary from quarter to quarter. This captures the possibility that different types of households show up
to purchase a new automobile at different times of the year.
We specify the indirect utility derived from consumer i purchasing product j, dropping the time sub-
script, as
uijq = Xjd+xj ¡aiqpj +å
k
jkiikxjk+zig+(1¡k)Jij; (14)
where pj denotes the price of product j and xjk 2 Xj is the kth observable characteristic of product j.
The term Xjd+xj, where d are parameters to be estimated, represents the utility from product j that is
common to all consumers, or a mean level of utility. Consumers then have a distribution of tastes for each
observable characteristic. For each characteristic k, consumer i has a taste iik, which is drawn from an
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard normal distribution. The parameter jk captures
the variance in consumer tastes.
The term aiq measures a consumer’s distaste for price increases in quarter q = f1;2;3;4g. Following
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999), we assume that aiq =
aq
yi , where aq is a parameter to be estimated and
yi is a draw from the income distribution. We assume the distribution of household income is lognormal,
and, for each year in our sample, we estimate its mean and variance from the Current Population Survey.
The second-to-last term in equation (14) captures correlations in a consumer’s tastes for products within
the same group. For consumer i, the variable zig is common to all products in group g and has a distribution
that depends upon k. Finally, Jij is an i.i.d. extreme value.
Consumers choose among the j = 1;2;:::;J automobiles in our sample and the outside good (denoted
j = 0), which represents the choice not to buy a new automobile from the Big Three. Consumers choose
the product j that maximizes utility, and market shares are obtained by aggregating over consumers.
The dataset of prices and sales for the Big Three is used to estimate the model, generally following
15Market Segment Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
Compact 8.2 9.2 7.9 8.6 7.8 8.3 8.8 8.8
Full 10.3 11.3 9.1 9.6 10.0 11.4 10.5 10.6
Luxury 9.8 11.4 8.4 9.0 9.9 11.0 9.2 9.2
Midsize 9.4 10.5 8.9 9.7 9.4 10.0 8.9 8.1
Pickup 9.7 10.8 9.1 9.0 9.8 10.8 8.9 11.6
SUV 9.7 10.7 8.6 8.6 9.9 10.8 9.6 8.6
Sporty 10.8 10.9 9.1 10.0 9.8 11.7 9.3 8.6
Van 10.2 11.6 9.7 10.1 10.2 10.9 9.6 5.8
Single Source 10.1 11.0 9.0 9.5 9.8 11.0 9.3 8.6
Table 6: The Absolute Value of Own-Price Elasticities by Market Segment and Quarter
BLP’s algorithm. We aggregate sales and prices to the quarterly frequency because of volatility in monthly
sales due, in part, to intertemporal substitution. We do not estimate the model at an annual frequency
because the variation in price and in the consumer’s choice set from quarter-to-quarter is a signiﬁcant
source of identiﬁcation in the BLP framework. Lastly, we augment the data with vehicle characteristic
information from Automotive News’ Market Data Book (various years).
The estimated elasticities that result from the discrete-choice estimation are reported in table 6. These
elasticities provide the clearest picture of the values of the semi-elasticities that we use in our speciﬁed
demand function. The own-price elasticities generated by our parameter estimates range between 6 and
12, an indication that manufacturers face quite elastic demand. In the ﬁrst quarter a car is sold, our results
imply that a 1 percent price increase for a typical compact car (roughly $140) causes an 8.2 percent fall
in sales, holding everything else equal. The average own-price elasticity for all single-source vehicles is
reported in the “Single Source” row. In general, our estimated elasticities are higher than those found in
the previous literature; BLP, for example, report a range of elasticities between 3 and 6. This difference is
not surprising, however, because previous research estimated own-price elasticities for models, a level of
aggregation higher than that of our data. Indeed, when we re-estimate the parameters from data aggregated
to the model level, the implied own-price elasticities fall within the range reported in BLP.
Whilewecomputeelasticitiesbyquarter, ourmodeloftheﬁrmisattheweeklyfrequency. Toconstruct
the weekly demand curves, equation (3), we use our discrete choice model to construct quarterly own-price
semi-elasticities for the typical single-source vehicle. We then interpolate these semi-elasticities to the
weekly frequency using a spline. To compute the intercept terms µt; t =1;2;:::104, we ﬁrst interpolate the
monthly price/quantity-sold pairs for an average single-course plant to the weekly level; we then require
16each demand curve to go through the interpolated price-quantity pair for its corresponding week. This
yields a set of 104 demand curves that are falling (i.e. shifting to the southwest corner) over the product
cycle.
3.2 Estimating the Firm’s Decision Problem via Indirect Inference
Because of the non-convexities in the cost function, we solve for both the optimal level of output and the
cost minimizing production schedule through grid search. The grids for Dt and St are set from 1 to 6 and
from 0 to 2, respectively, in increments of 1. The plant is closed for the week whenever St = 0. The shift
length, ht, can take on values of 7, 8, 9 or 10. We allow weekly production (Dt £St £ht £LS) to take
values between 0 and 120£LS in increments of LS. So there are up to 72 feasible production schedules to
evaluate for each 121 possible levels of production.
We discretize the inventory grid into 26 points from 0 to 85,000. The distance between grid points
increases with the level of inventories. Thus, the grid points are more densely spaced in the region where
the value function has more curvature. We discretize the z grid into 11 points from -0.025 to 0.025; the
grid points are more densely spaced near zero, and the distance between grid points increases the further
points are away from zero. For each of the 286 (i;z) pairs, we maximize recursively the right hand side
of equations (11) and (12) over each sales price and level of output. Points off the inventory and z grids
are approximated using bi-linear interpolation, and all integration is done by quadrature. The sales price,
pt may take on any positive value such that quantity demanded remains positive. Finally, we impose a
standard holiday schedule on production; we assume the plant is closed for days corresponding to Labor
Day (1 day, week 8), Thanksgiving (2 days, week 19), Christmas/New Year’s (5 days, week 24), Martin
Luther King Day (1 day, week 27), Good Friday (1 day, week 37), Memorial Day (1 day, week 46), and
the July model changeover/vacation (10 days, weeks 51 and 52).
We estimate the supply-side parameters along with the demand-shock processes via indirect inference
using the extended method of simulated moments (EMSM) proposed by Smith (1993). This approach
selects the set of structural parameters, b, that minimizes the distance between a set of observed moments
ˆ qT and those generated by numerical simulations of the structural model. In this case, the moments to be
matched are the 15 regression coefﬁcients from the set of full regressions of sales, price and production,
reported in table 5, the error covariance matrix of the sales and price regressions, the variance of the pro-
duction regression, and three coefﬁcients obtained from separately regressing sales, price and production
17on a constant.13 These last three equations provide the mean levels of sales, prices and production at a
single-source plant for the model to match. The full regression coefﬁcients and error covariance matrix
capture the dynamics of prices, sales, and production. Note that the price and production equations can
be interpreted as empirical counterparts of the model’s decision rules for prices and production, equation
(13). In the model weekly prices and production are functions of the three state variables: zt, it and t.
Of course, in the data we observe monthly rather than weekly prices, and we do not observe the state of
demand zt. One can interpret st¡1 and pt¡1 as providing a measure of zt¡1.
In addition to the demand curves, we ﬁx several supply-side parameters prior to the estimation. We
set the “scrap value” of vehicles unsold after 104 weeks ¯ p105 to $19,000. We set the number of work-
ers per shift, n to 1300. We set the overtime premium to 1.5 (i.e. “time and a half”), the second-shift
premium to 1.05, (i.e. w2=w1 = 1.05), and the short week premium to 0.85 as speciﬁed in the union
contracts. Let b denote the vector of the remaining structural parameters that we wish to estimate:
b = fr;r;sw;g;t;y;u;w1;LSg.
The basic strategy to estimate the model is:14
1. Use the data to compute estimates of the coefﬁcients and the variance-covariance matrix of the
residuals for the set of regressions stated in equation (2) as well as the least square estimates of the
mean level of sales, price, and production, ˆ qT. Our estimates of ˆ qT are reported in table 8.
2. For a given set of parameters b, solve the structural model.
3. Simulate the model for 104 weeks S times and aggregate each simulation to the monthly frequency
to create a 24£S panel dataset y(b). For each simulation, initialize z using a draw from its ergodic
distribution.
4. Estimate the set of full regressions and the three least squares means listed in the ﬁrst step, using
y(b) to compute ˆ q
b
S. Measure the distance between the vector of observed parameters and the vector
of simulated parameters via the criterion:
(1+p¡1)¡1(ˆ qT ¡ ˆ q
b
S)0WT(ˆ qT ¡ ˆ q
b
S) (15)
13We do not attempt to match the covariances between the production residuals and the price and sales residuals because of the
different sample sizes. Recall that the production regression used the 12 months of data that a plant produced a vehicle, while the
sales and price regressions used the 17 months of data for which a typical vehicle was sold.
14Since we follow Smith’s (1993) methodology rather closely we describe it only generally and refer readers to Smith’s paper
for a complete description of the derivations and asymptotics.
18r† g t y r sw u w1 LS
0.0140 22,270 0.423 0.907 0.954 0.000772 0.697 58.92 40.18
0.0107 114 0.080 0.140 0.005 0.000061 0.185 7.21 0.80
Table 7: EMSM estimates of the structural parameters
Note: The ﬁrst row of the table reports point estimates. The second row of the table reports estimated standard errors.
† The interest rate r is reported at an annual rate.
where the weighting matrix, WT ´ AT(qT)BT(qT)¡1AT(qT). AT(qT) and BT(qT) are the Hessian
of the likelihood function and the information matrix, respectively, for the set of full regressions
described earlier and the three OLS regressions of sales, price and production on a constant. We
compute these matrices numerically. We compute BT(qT) using the Newey-West (1987) estimator
with two lags. Since ¡AT(qT) ¼ BT(qT) the weighting matrix is the inverse of variance-covariance
matrix of the observed parameters taking into account the model mis-speciﬁcation. The term p
denotes the ratio of the simulation sample size to the data sample size.
5. Using a hill-climbing algorithm, repeat steps 2 - 4 to ﬁnd the ˜ bT that minimizes (15).
We set the number of simulations S to 298, twice the number of plant/model years in our dataset. Thus
p = 2.
In table 7 we report point estimates for the structural parameters together with estimated standard
errors. The estimated parameter values are sensible. The interest rate, which is the sole cost of holding
inventories, is estimated to be 1.4 percent at an annual rate with a standard error of 1.1. Even though
this represents a real rate of interest, it still seems low. The estimate may be picking up some implicit
value to holding inventories. The per-vehicle material cost, g is estimated to be $22,270. Because of the
non-convexities in the cost function, the marginal cost of production is a discontinuous, non-monotonic
function. However, when the plant operates two 40-hour-shifts per week, the average cost of production
is $24,176. In this case the per-vehicle labor cost is $1906. The average proﬁt per vehicle is about $1804.
The revenue-tax parameters, t (the tax rate) and y (the curvature parameter) are estimated to be 0:42 and
0:91 respectively. Hence, the revenue tax is a concave function of the sales-to-inventory ratio.
The z process is estimated to be quite persistent with an auto-regressive coefﬁcient of 0.954 and a
standard deviation of the innovations (sw) of 0.000772. This implies the ergodic distribution of z has a
mean of zero (by assumption) and a standard deviation of 0.0026. While a standard deviation of 3/10 of
one-percent may seem small, a one standard deviation drop in z results in a downward parallel shift in the
19demand curve of 350 to 780 vehicles per week (depending on the value of µt).
The point estimate of the ﬁrst-shift wage rate w1 is reasonable, $58:92 per hour, if one accounts for
both beneﬁts and wages but it is not particularly interesting since it can be scaled up and down by our
choice of n. Our estimate of the unemployment replacement rate, u, is of more economic interest. It
is estimated to be 0.697. In the U.S., if an assembly plant closes for a week, the workers are laid off.
After a single waiting week each year, laid-off workers receive 95 cents on the dollar of their 40 hour
pay in unemployment compensation. Of this 95 cents, state unemployment insurance (UI) pays about 60
cents. The remaining 35 cents is covered by supplemental unemployment beneﬁts (SUB). Firms do not
pay laid-off workers directly, but laying off workers does increase the ﬁrm’s experience rating and future
UI premiums. Aizcorbe (1990) and Anderson and Meyer (1993) report that due to the cross-industry
subsidies inherent in the UI system, ﬁrms end up paying about half of the 60 cents coming from UI. Since
the SUB is a negotiated beneﬁt between the ﬁrm and the union, the ﬁrm ultimately pays all 35 cents. So,
after the initial waiting week, it costs the ﬁrm about 65 percent of the 40 hour wage to lay a worker off for
one week. This is quite close to (i.e. well within one standard error) our estimate of 0.697.
Finally our point estimate of the line speed of 40.18 vehicles per hour is consistent with observed line
speeds at assembly plants. In our dataset plant line speed vary between 30 to 70 vehicles per hour.
Theestimationcriterion(15)providesatest-statisticfortheover-identifyingrestrictionsofthemodel.15
This statistic is distributed c2(n¡k). In our case there are ten over-identifying restrictions (n-k=19-9), and
the statistic is 746.7. Thus our structural model can be overwhelmingly rejected as the true data-generating
process of the observed time series. Nevertheless, the model captures much of the interesting dynamics in
the data.
Table 8 tabulates two sets of estimated parameters, one set for the observed data and one set for the
simulated data given the estimated structural parameters in table 7.16 Eight of the 19 simulated moments
are within a single standard error of their corresponding observed moments, and almost all of the simulated
moments are of the same sign and magnitude as the observed moments. The model implies a high level
of auto-correlation in both sales and prices. The model also implies the higher inventories are associated
15Readers may notice that the criterion in (15) is not scaled by the number of observations. As discussed in section 1, the
number of observations differ across the sales, price and production regressions. The individual elements of the AT(qT) and
BT(qT) matrices are scaled appropriately to take this in account, so we do not ‘pull a T out to the front’ of the expression.
16Our useof a setof regressionsofsales, price and productionto evaluatetheﬁt of theﬁrm’sdecision problem isquite similar in
spirit to the analysis by Hay (1970). Hay calibrated a linear-quadratic model of the ﬁrm, took ﬁrst order-conditions and compared
informally the SUR of prices, production, and inventories implied by his model to two SURs estimated using data on the lumber
and paper industries. Our ﬁndings are consistent with those of Hay.
20Sales Equation Price Equation Production Equation
parameter observed simulated observed simulated observed simulated
lagged price 0.172 -0.0146 0.787 0.865 0.787 1.762
0.035 0.0209 0.006 0.045 0.072 0.254
lagged sales 0.641 0.644 0.0443 0.0311 0.376 0.127
0.009 0.009 0.0051 0.0109 0.028 0.020
inventories 0.0858 0.0794 -0.0076 -0.0053 0.0250 0.0473
0.0024 0.0028 0.0012 0.0015 0.0064 0.0084
trend -0.104 -0.236 -0.0432 -0.0349 -0.194 -0.181
0.013 0.007 0.0036 0.0141 0.051 0.062
resid variance 5.33 1.60 0.691 0.619 15.39 4.95
0.10 0.04 0.009 0.252 0.44 0.20
R-squared 0.88 0.85 0.99 0.68 0.72 0.29
parameter observed simulated
cov(resid sales, resid price) -0.0741 0.0568
0.0503 0.0135
Sales Equation Price Equation Production Equation
parameter observed simulated observed simulated observed simulated
constant 8.952 8.959 26.036 25.970 12.600 12.298
0.202 0.049 0.223 0.015 0.332 0.045
Table 8: Estimated parameters using observed and simulated data
Note: The top and bottom numbers in each cell are, respectively, the point estimate and standard errors.
with higher sales, lower prices and higher production. In both the model and the data higher lagged prices
are associated higher production.
The three moments the model fails to match by wide margins are the variance of residuals in the
sales and production regressions, and the covariance between the sales and price residuals. To check how
important these moments are to the estimates of the parameter values, we re-estimated the model dropping
the four second moments. The value of the estimation criterion falls from 746.7 to 165.5, but the point
estimates and the standard errors of the structural parameters are not interestingly different. The estimated
wage rate rises to 64.2, and the line speed falls to 37.1; the other parameter are essentially unchanged. So
these second moments are not playing an essential role in determining the point estimates. To better match
these second moments, we tried adding an idiosyncratic multiplicative shock to the production function
(8) and an idiosyncratic additive shock the demand curve (3). In each case, these additional shocks were
estimated to have tiny variances and thus negligible impacts on the dynamics of the model. Further these
additional shocks had very little impact on the value of the criterion (15).
The model’s relevance is further bolstered by the fact that it matches some key patterns in the data
21that are not explicitly estimated. Figures 3 to 6 plot the the weekly paths of prices, sales, production and
inventories shutting down all the shocks (i.e. wt =08t). Figures 3 and 4 also plot the price and sales trends
observed in the data. The model’s baseline price and sales paths track the trends in the data reasonably
well. The model successfully replicates the downward track in prices coinciding with the hump-shaped
pattern in sales. The model also nails the averages. In the data the mean price is $26,036 and the mean
weekly sales rate is 8,952 vehicles; in the model, these averages are $25,970 and 8,959. Early in the
product cycle, the model slightly overestimates prices and underestimates sales. Later in the product cycle
(after about week 40) the model underestimates prices and overestimates sales. Nonetheless, overall it
does a good job mimicking the levels and basic shapes of these two series.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the weekly baseline time paths for production and inventories. The plant operates
at near full capacity (two 60-hour shifts per week) for the ﬁrst four weeks in the production cycle and then
(with exception of holidays) runs two 40-hours shifts per week for the remainder of the product cycle.
This pattern generate the negative monthly time trend in the full production regression reported in table 8.
Adding shocks breaks up this pattern somewhat, but production is still predicted to be smoother in our
model than we observe in the data. The variance of the residual for the full production regression for the
model is one-third the variance we see in the data. Overall the plant in the model runs overtime 8 percent
of time (versus 30 percent in the data) and is shut down for inventory adjustments 2.5 percent of the time
(compared to 6 percent in the data). The hump-shaped pattern of inventories is similar to that observed in
the data, and the model generates about the right level of inventories. Speciﬁcally, the model predicts an
average inventory-to-sales ratio of 75 days of supply with a standard deviation of 25. For the single-source
models in our data, this average ratio is 79 with a standard deviation of 51.
The revenue tax in equation (10) plays a central role in generating the time paths for these four series.
During the ﬁrst weeks of the production cycle inventories are naturally low, and thus it is costly to sell a
lot of vehicles. In order to reduce this tax in the future, the automaker needs to accumulate inventories.
Hence, early on, the automaker sets prices high to dampen sales and produces at a high capacity allowing
the inventory stock to rise. Once inventories have reached a sufﬁcient level, the tax effectively disappears
and the automaker lowers prices in order to stimulate sales. Further exacerbating this fall in prices, demand
for the vehicle decreases as the product cycle progresses.
To measure the model’s propensity to use weeklong shutdowns to adjust production, we estimated the
probit model described in equation (1) on the set of 298 model simulations (allowing for shocks to w).
The estimated coefﬁcients and standard errors are reported in table 9 along with the estimates from the

























































































































































Baseline Time Paths of Prices, Sales, Production, and Inventories
Notes: The red dashed lines in ﬁgures 3 and 4 are the price and sales trends from the data.













Table 9: Estimated probit parameters using observed and simulated data
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.
data ﬁrst reported in table 4. The ﬁrst thing to note is that signs on the coefﬁcients of price, sales, and
inventories are the same as in the data: the likelihood of a shutdown increases as the level of inventory
increases; it decreases as prices and sales rise. However, the three of the four model’s coefﬁcients are an
order or two magnitude higher than we see in the data. Perhaps this reﬂects considerable more noise in the
data than in the simulations. This possibility is supported by the R2 on the simulation probit of .87 while
the R2 of the data probit is .12.
4 Dynamics and Conditional Responses
This section examines how the ﬁrm responds to persistent demand shocks. The ﬁrm’s optimal response to
these shocks is non-linear and history dependent. Therefore we report the responses of sales, prices and
production to negative innovations to z conditioning on three distinct histories. These distinct realizations
of prior shocks push the level of inventories, i, and the state of demand, z, into different regions of the state
space. Thus, we can measure how the ﬁrm responds to shocks of various magnitudes at different points in
the state space.
To implement this, we look at negative innovations of varying magnitudes both early and late in the
production cycle: weeks 12 and 35.17 To vary the initial conditions of z and i, we study cases in which the
ﬁrm faces: 1) no shocks in weeks prior to the innovation, 2) a series of positive shocks in the weeks prior
to the innovation; and 3) a series on negative shocks in the weeks prior to the innovation. More precisely,
17While the ﬁrm does not respond symmetrically to positive and negative innovations, the results are qualitatively similar. To
conserve on space, we only report results for negative innovations.
24in the ﬁrst case, we shut down all the shocks except for a single innovation to z at week t¤; that is we set
wt =
½
¡Fsw if t =t¤, where F =0; 1
2, 1 or 2
0 otherwise.
(16)





¡Fsw if t =t¤, where F =0; 1
2, 1, or 2
1
3sw if t¤¡10 <t <t¤
0 otherwise.
(17)





¡Fsw if t =t¤, where F =0; 1
2, 1, or 2
¡1
3sw if t¤¡10 <t <t¤
0 otherwise.
(18)
In ﬁgures 7 to 10 we plot impulse response functions for prices, sales, production, and inventories to a
two-standard deviation shock to z during week 12 (month 3). The lines plotted in the four ﬁgures are the
differences in levels between the response for F = 2 and the response for F = 0. In each case, the time
paths have been aggregated to the monthly frequency.
The main point to take away from these graphs is that prices and sales respond in months immediately
following the innovation (which occurs in month 3) but production responds months later. Since automo-
biles are built-to-stock rather than built-to-order, production does not need to respond simultaneously with
prices and sales.
At impact both prices and sales fall. The marginal response of sales is largest in the month right after
the shock. The response diminishes over time, and after 5 months or so (month 8), the effects of the
shock on sales are largely gone. For the positive and neutral history cases, sales are higher in than without
the shock after month eight, even though our demand speciﬁcation does not have any role for ‘pent-up
demand’. Prices, on the other hand, fall only very little in the month after the shock but continue to decline
for several months. For all neutral and positive histories, prices never return to their no-shock baseline
levels. This persistence in the price response is not due to ‘sticky prices.’ There are no price rigidities in
the model. Instead these persistent lower prices are due to the desire to boost sales to make up for lost sales
earlier in the model year (i.e ‘pent-up supply’). Further the price response is quite modest; a two-standard
deviation shock to demand causes only a $200 decline in prices on a $26,000 vehicle.
The production response is completely different. Examination of ﬁgure 9 shows that for all three
histories output does not respond to the shock for seven months. The output response occurs in months
11 and 12 after the sales response has largely died out. This propagation occurs even though there are






























Figure 7: Price Response









































Figure 8: Sales Response












































Figure 9: Production Response














































Figure 10: Inventory Response.
Response of Prices, Sales, Production, and Inventories to a Two Standard-Deviation Negative Innovation
to z at Week 12 (Month 3).
Notes: The responses have been time-aggregated to the monthly frequency.
Each line plots the difference between the time path of the variable with F = 2 and the time path with F = 0.
The black solid line is the response of the variables under the negative history case (i.e. w12 = ¡2sw; wt = ¡sw=3 for t =
2;3;:::;11; and wt = 0 for t > 12).
The blue dashed line is the response of the four variables under the neutral history case (i.e. w12 = ¡2sw; wt = 0 otherwise).
The red dot-dashed line is the response of the four variables under the positive history case (i.e. w12 = ¡2sw; wt = sw=3 for
t = 2;3;:::;11; and wt = 0 for t > 12).
26no adjustment costs in the model. Because of the nonconvexities in the ﬁrm’s cost function, the ﬁrm
wishes to operate the plant at its minimum efﬁcient scale. In this case, the ﬁrm minimizes average cost by
running two 40-hour shifts per week producing 3175 vehicles per week. Below the MES the ﬁrm can only
convexify its cost function over time via temporary shutdowns; therefore the nonconvexities can induce
a lag between the price and production responses. Further because higher inventories reduce the revenue
tax, the ﬁrm prefers to postpone shutdowns until the end of the product cycle. Finally, because of this lag
between the two responses, inventories rise in the months immediately after the innovation.
Despite the importance of the nonconvexities in the timing of the production response, the ﬁrm can
convexify its costs over time. Thus it is not obvious that the optimal longer-term responses are nonlinear.
To address this issue, we summarize the impulse response for 18 different innovations in tables 10. For
each innovation (i.e. history, week, and F), we report the percentage difference between the realization of
the model with F = 1=2, 1 or 2 and the realization of the model with F = 0.
Some basic patterns emerge from table 10. First the marginal price and sales response at impact
(columns (2) and (3)) are proportional to the size of the shock. In each case the magnitude of the marginal
response with F = 2 is twice the magnitude with F = 1 and four times that of F = 1=2. Also in each
case, the sales responses at impact are considerably larger than the price responses. This is partially due
to the size of the elasticities estimated in section 3.1. These elasticities measure the sales response for a
particular make and model to a change in price holding the demand for all other vehicles constant. If we
want to interpret these demand shocks as aggregate demand shocks, the sizes of our elasticities represent
upper bounds.
Holding F ﬁxed, the price responses are largest (and thus the sales responses are smallest) for the
positive history paths. The prices responses are smallest (and thus the sales responses are largest) for the
negative history paths. While this effect is small (the price responses for the ﬁrst four months following the
shock in ﬁgure 7 look almost identical), the intuition is straightforward. The lower the level of inventories,
the higher is the marginal value of an additional unit of inventory to the ﬁrm. Since a series of positive
shocks to z reduces the level of inventories, it raises the shadow value of inventories to the ﬁrm leading the
ﬁrm to charge higher prices and dampen sales.
In all 18 cases production (column (4)) does not respond in the weeks immediately after the shock.
This however does not imply there is no production response. In columns (5)-(7) of table 10 we report
the marginal cumulative response of prices, sales and production over the remainder of the product cycle.
Unlike the price and sales response at impact, the cumulative price and sales responses are not proportional
27F
Response at Impact Cumulative Response over Cycle
Price Sales Product Price Sales Product Wages Proﬁts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Negative History: Week 12 Shock
1/2 -0.004 -4.75 0.00 0.00 -1.10 -1.39 -0.47 -0.27
1 -0.008 -9.48 0.00 -0.04 -1.10 -1.39 -0.47 -0.56
2 -0.016 -18.98 0.00 -0.09 -2.18 -2.74 -0.88 -1.18
Neutral History: Week 12 Shock
1/2 -0.004 -3.92 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.22
1 -0.009 -7.85 0.00 -0.08 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.45
2 -0.019 -15.64 0.00 -0.12 -1.11 -1.37 -0.47 -0.96
Positive History: Week 12 Shock
1/2 -0.005 -3.40 0.00 -0.04 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.13
1 -0.009 -6.80 0.00 -0.08 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.29
2 -0.020 -13.55 0.00 -0.15 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.65
Negative History: Week 35 Shock
1/2 -0.004 -4.54 0.00 -0.01 -1.71 -3.38 -0.96 -0.19
1 -0.007 -9.09 0.00 -0.08 -1.71 -3.38 -0.96 -0.37
2 -0.015 -18.17 0.00 -0.15 -3.47 -6.85 -2.07 -0.77
Neutral History: Week 35 Shock
1/2 -0.004 -3.88 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.14
1 -0.008 -7.77 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.30
2 -0.016 -13.22 0.00 -0.20 -1.77 -3.24 -1.08 -0.62
Positive History: Week 35 Shock
1/2 -0.004 -3.32 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.08
1 -0.009 -6.65 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.17
2 -0.018 -13.30 0.00 -0.26 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.39
Table 10: Conditional Responses to w Innovations in Weeks 12 or 35
Note: For each panel, columns (2), (3), and (4) report the percent differences in prices, sales, and production one week after the
shock between the F = 1=2, 1, 2 cases and the F = 0 baseline.
Columns (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) report the percent differences in the sum of prices, sales, production, wages and proﬁts for the
remainder of the product cycle between the F = 1=2, 1, 2 cases and the F = 0 baseline.
28to size of the shock. This non-proportionate result follows from the nonconvexities in the cost function.
When the ﬁrm operates below its minimum efﬁcient scale, it will tend to use more non-convex margins
to adjust output (e.g. weeklong shutdowns); but when it operates above its MES it will tend to use more
convex margins of adjustment (e.g. overtime). Hence we would expect the nonconvexities to matter more
(and the responses to be more nonlinear) under the negative and neutral history cases and less under the
positive history cases.
It is often argued that ﬁrms respond to small shocks by changing prices and large shocks by changing
production. For example, Haltiwanger and Maccini (1988) ﬁnd that a fraction of the ﬁrms in their model
only adjust production in the face of large shocks. This view is generally consistent our results. In four of
the six cases (shock week and histories) there is no production response to shocks of F = 1=2 and F = 1;
the shock is absorbed by prices alone. But in four of the six cases with F = 2 size shocks the ﬁrm uses
both margins, prices and production, to absorb the shock.
Finally, we can also examine the response of the discounted streams of wages for the workers and
proﬁts for the ﬁrm. For both the week 12 shock and week 35 shock, the proﬁt stream falls roughly one-
for-one (perhaps a little more than one-for-one) with the size of the shock. It appears that the owners have
enough margins at their disposal to dampen the effects of the demand shocks on proﬁts. Also wages fall
by only a third of the fall in output.18
The relationship between the size of the price and production production responses and the size of the
shock to z merits additional analysis. Figures 11 and 12 report the cumulative relative responses of prices
and production under the negative history case as functions of the size of the shock.19 In both ﬁgures,
the production decline is a step function in the size of the shock. Between each threshold, prices decline
linearly in the size of the shock. Because the production response is ﬁxed between the thresholds and
demand is falling linearly in the size in the size of the shock, the ﬁrm lowers prices so that supply equals
demand. The discrete drops in production thus generate discrete increases in prices.
Globally, the relationships between the size of the shock and the size of the production and price
responses are linear. In week 12, the size of the marginal cumulative production and price responses for
F = 2 are twice the size of the responses for F = 1. However important local nonconvexities still survive
time-aggregation. In both weeks 12 and 35, a small negative shock to w (less than one-half of a standard
18When computing wages, we assume workers on temporary layoffs receive 95 percent of their straight-time 40-hour wage,
the statutory replacement rate. We interpret the difference between .95 and our point estimate of u as representing cross-subsidies
from other ﬁrms inherent in the UI system.
19These curves correspond to columns (5) and (7) in table 10.
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Figure 11: Week 12 Shock: The Marginal Cumulative Responses of Prices and Production
Note: This ﬁgure plots the magnitudes of the marginal cumulative responses of prices and production as functions of the
magnitude of a negative shock to z during week 12.




















































Size of ω shock in standard deviations
← production
prices →
























































Figure 12: Week 35 Shock: The Marginal Cumulative Responses of Prices and Production
Note: This ﬁgure plots the magnitudes of the marginal cumulative responses of prices and production as functions of the magni-
tude of a negative shock to z during week 35. 30deviation) causes output to fall but prices to rise over the remainder of the product cycle. A small increase
in the size of the shock during week 12 that pushes the ﬁrm over a threshold results in a cumulative
production decline of about 1.4 percent; for week 35, this production decline can be as large as 6 percent.
In sum, although the nonconvexities make the production decision almost discrete at the weekly frequency
(either all-on or all-off), the ﬁrm has enough margins to vary the workweek of capital over the reminder of
the production cycle so that its costs are quasi-linear. Hence its production and price responses aggregated
over time become globally linear to the size of the shock.
5 A demand shock that was and a demand shock that was not
Our model and data set can be used to explain automakers’ reactions to two recent events. One is when
the Ford Explorer tire-tread separation problems became public during 2000. The second, is the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.
5.1 The Firestone/Ford Explorer Tire Recall of 2000
On August 9, 2000, Ford and Firestone issued the second largest tire recall in history, recalling more than
6.5 million tires because of tire tread-separation problems. Tires on several models were recalled, but the
majority were mounted as original equipment on the Ford Explorer, a highly popular SUV. Even before the
recall, bad publicity surrounding the Explorer had begun to snowball as law ﬁrm web sites and television
news shows attributed 46 deaths to the tires. Sales of new Explorers fell, while sales for other SUVs
rose, as concerns about the Explorer’s safety prompted consumers to switch to other models. This episode
provides an example of a demand shock to a single make and model.
Figures 13 through 16 show the difference between Ford Explorer’s monthly sales, prices, production,
and inventories in 2000 and the average monthly sales, prices, production, and inventories for Ford Ex-
plorers in all other years in our sample (1999, 2001, 2002, 2003). At the beginning of 2000, prices, sales
and production of the Ford Explorer were above their benchmark averages, likely driven by the robust eco-
nomic growth at that time. By the end of the ﬁrst quarter, however, sales and prices started to fall relative
to their averages, a trend that continued throughout the year. Looking at the scales of the price and sales
paths (ﬁgures 13 and 14) we see that the relative magnitudes of the responses (roughly 10 to 1 in sales to
prices) are consistent with the responses reported from our model in ﬁgures 7 and 8.
Ford Explorer production did not immediately react to the fall in consumer demand. Rather, it contin-









































































































































































































































The Monthly Path of Prices, Sales, Production, and Inventories for the Ford Explorer During the Year 2000
In each graph the solid blue line displays the difference between the monthly series during 2000 and the average monthly series
Ford Explorers in all other years in our sample (1999, 2001, 2002, 2003).
32half. In addition to reacting to declining demand, Ford Explorer production was halted for three weeks in
August to increase the supply of new tires available for the tire recall. Explorer inventories remained at or
below its average through the ﬁrst half of 2000, before exploding upward in June, July, and August. The
slowdown in September production helped bring inventories down, but they still remained high at the end
of 2000. Note that inventories and prices are negatively correlated with a correlation coefﬁcient of -0.46.
The Ford Explorer time series of sales, prices, production and inventories in 2000 are generally in line
withourmodel’spredictions. AsthepublicbegantolearnoftheFordExplorer’stread-separationproblems
in the spring of 2000, consumer demand fell. Similar to the impulse-response graphs generated by our
model, Ford initially responded to this fall in demand by lowering price and maintaining production. Then
in the latter half of 2000, Ford reacted to the slump in demand for Ford Explorers by cutting production,
and bringing inventories back to its historical average.
5.2 Post-September 11, 2001
The tradeoff between automobile price and production was discussed prominently in the popular press dur-
ing September and October of 2001. In the days immediately following the terrorist attacks of September
11, auto sales fell by one-third and Standard & Poor’s reported, “Industry demand is now expected to be
exceptionally weak for the next two quarters, at least, and the likelihood of any improvement beyond that
time is highly uncertain.”20 Ford Motor Company then announced it was cutting third quarter output by
12 percent. This decision was subtly criticized as being detrimental to the macroeconomy during a time of
war. Dieter Zetesche, head of Daimler Chrysler AG’s Chrysler group stated, “I think it is our responsibility
to try to do whatever we can to contribute to stability. Not to overreact ... not to try to pre-empt shortfalls
on the demand side with production cuts.” GM North American President Ron Zarrella added “... GM has
a responsibility to help stimulate the economy by encouraging Americans to purchase vehicles, to support
our dealers and suppliers, and to keep our plants operating and our employees working.”21 After a Septem-
ber 19 meeting in Detroit of Commerce Secretary Donald Evans and Labor Secretary Elaine Chao with
top auto executives and union ofﬁcials, General Motors reafﬁrmed it existing production schedules and
introduced zero percent ﬁnancing incentives under its “Keep America Rolling” campaign. Ford, Chrysler,
and several foreign automakers soon matched these discounts.
20Krebs M.L. “Driving Through and Altered Landscape,” New York Times, September 23, 2001, section 12, page1.
21Both quotations are from White, G.L. and J.B. White “GM Unveils Interest-Free Offer on All U.S. Model” Wall Street
Journal, September 20, 2001, page A3. For more quotations on the patriotism of price cuts, see Burton T.M. and J.T. Hallinan
























































































































































































































Figure 20: Industry Inventory Response.
The Aggregate Time Paths of Prices, Sales, Production, and Inventories
During Late 2001 and Early 2002.
In each graph the solid blue line displays the difference between the monthly series during 2001 and the average monthly series
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Cash Rebate → 
↑ Financial Incentive
Figure 21: Value of Cash Rebates and Financing Incentives
Patriotism as well as long-term public relations considerations no doubt played key roles in these
decisions during the emotional weeks after 9/11; nevertheless we would not expect the automakers to
throw proﬁt maximization out the window. To analyze the industry response to the terrorist attacks, we
graph the difference between prices, sales, production and inventories levels for every month from June
of 2001 through February of 2002 against the average price, sales, production and inventory level for all
remaining months in our sample. The ﬁrst, and a surprising, fact illustrated in ﬁgures 17 through 20 is the
increase in relative prices from September to October. This is not an artifact of the normalization. Average
prices rose 3.7 percent un-normalized. Perhaps even more surprising, this price increase corresponds with
a massive sales increase of 42 percent (un-normalized). These price and sales responses are inconsistent
with a persistent drop in demand.
Despite the desires voiced by executives to maintain high levels of production, September production
was quite a bit lower than the average. This drop in production was largely due to parts disruptions related
to increased border security arising after September 11th. October production remained low, however,
largely because of a number of inventory shutdowns. Using weekly production data for single source
plants, during September and October of 2001, shutdowns for inventory adjustment accounted for 8.7
percent of all production days. This is almost three times as large as the average 3.0 percent of production
days factories closed for inventory adjustment during the months of September and October in 1999, 2000,
352002, and 2003.
The conventional wisdom that automakers heavily slashed prices on their vehicles after 9/11 is not
conﬁrmed by our data. Despite the zero-percent ﬁnancing incentives introduced in late September, the
average price of new vehicles net of incentives and rebates rose slightly. Part of the explanation lies in the
mix of incentives that customers received. In ﬁgure 21, we plot the time paths of the average value per
vehicle of ﬁnancing incentives and cash rebates. Automakers increased ﬁnancial incentives modestly in
late 2001. Nonetheless, this increase was more than offset by the drop in cash rebates.
Why did demand not fall, but actually rise during the Autumn of 2001? Some consumers may have
been motivated to buy a new car out of patriotism.22 But it appears to us that the zero-interest ﬁnancing,
while not reducing prices, reduced the need for consumers to haggle and search across dealership to ﬁnd
the best deal. Zero-percent ﬁnancing is an easily understood pricing arrangement and eliminates at least
one dimension that car dealers can price discriminate across consumers. It simpliﬁes the buying process
much like the “employee discount pricing” programs in the Summer of 2005. It appears that consumers
prefer simpliﬁed pricing; they were eager to buy and even paid more to avoid more complicated haggling.
While the solution to the ﬁrm’s decision problem formulated in this paper provides insights into the timing
and relative magnitudes of price and production responses, it is silent on the value of price discrimination
and opaque pricing to the ﬁrm.
6 Conclusion
One often reads statements such as:
With its labor costs ﬁxed because of employment guarantees and large pension and retiree
health costs, Detroit can’t adjust supply to meet demand – so it must rely on price adjustments
alone.23
Not only popular discussions of the automobile industry but formal analysis as well has tended to focus
either on production adjustments or price adjustments, assuming the other variable is ﬁxed. This paper has
shown the Big Three automakers utilize both price and production adjustments concurrently even in the
short run. In contrast to the statement above, we ﬁnd that for sufﬁciently large demand shocks, most of the
adjustments over time are made to supply rather than prices.
22For example, Freeman S., “September Auto Sales Showed Resilience” Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2001, page A2 quotes
a consumer who is bought a new PT Cruiser to “do his part” for the economy.
23Jenkins H., “Why Detroit Can’t Stop Haggling” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2005, page A11.
36Ourmodelsuggeststhattheuseofinventoriesalongwiththenonconvexitiespresentintheautomaker’s
cost function causes production adjustments to be propagated throughout the model year even though
prices and sales move immediately. Thus an observer with a static supply-and-demand model in mind
could be misled to believe the supply curve is vertical. This propagation occurs even though there are no
adjustment costs to varying the workweek of capital over time. These nonconvexities make the weekly
production decision nearly discrete (either all on or all off); but over the course of several months automak-
ers have sufﬁcient margins to dampen the effect of these nonconvexities considerably. As a consequence,
production and price responses aggregated over time are near linear in the size of the shock.
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